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NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE WAITE COURT
Michael Les Benedict
PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF
RECONSTRUCTION (Cambridge Univ. Press 2011). Pp. 282. Hardback. $90.00.
PAUL KENS, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER MORRISON R. WAITE, 1874-1888 (Univ.
of S.C. Press 2010). Pp. 272. Cloth. $49.95.
Legal scholars have never accorded the Waite Court the attention that they have
expended on such heavyweights as the Marshall, Taney, and Warren Courts. In his
survey, Professor Kens notes that "relatively few cases from the era have survived to be
part of our constitutional discourse." Yet, some of its decisions have had a profound
effect on American constitutional history and continue to shape the nation's
constitutional law today. At least four Waite Court's decisions remain foundational for
present-day constitutional law doctrine. The opinion in The Civil Rights Cases2 remains
the key case for the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment delegated power to
Congress only to counteract state action that deprived people of rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, as distinct from private invasions of rights. An offhand
comment in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co.3 established the
principle that corporations were entitled to the same constitutional rights as persons. In
Welton v. Missouri,4 the Court established the principle that states cannot levy taxes in
ways that discriminate against interstate commerce. In Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific
Railway Co. v. Illinois,5 the Court first applied the principle of the "dormant" interstate-
commerce clause to state railroad regulation. The Waite Court also established in Munn
v. Illinois (the so-called Granger Cases) 6 the doctrine that governments may regulate
businesses affected with a public interest. Now primarily of historical interest, it is
nonetheless an important and well-known decision, regularly discussed in studies of
American constitutional history. Not quite as well known any longer but equally
influential was Hurtado v. California,7 which held that the Fourteenth Amendment did
not apply the provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states.
Another foundational case illustrates how problematic it is to chronologize
1. PAUL KENs, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER MORRISON R. WAITE, 1874-1888, at 14 (2010).
2. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
3. Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
4. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875).
5. Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
6. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
7. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
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Supreme Court history by the terms of its chief justices. Any study of the "Waite Court"
has to include the Slaughter-House Cases,8 as do the two books under review here. 9 It
established the proposition that fundamental rights are not among the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States but rather pertain to state citizenship, and that
the Fourteenth Amendment bars state infringement only of the former and not the latter.
The Slaughter-House decision remains a bedrock of American constitutional law and
history. The Court has circumvented much of its force by interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause to bar states from infringing most of the provisions of
the Bill of Rights, but there is no way to tell how differently Americans' rights might
have been protected had the justices decided Slaughter-House the other way. Moreover,
it is truly a Waite Court case. Its parameters are consistent with and intimately connected
with the civil-rights law the Waite's Court developed even though it was decided months
before Waite was sworn in.
The Waite Court's decisions have been treated primarily in the histories of the
development of laissez-faire constitutionalism during the second half of the nineteenth
century and in assessments of Reconstruction and its aftermath.10 With regard to the
latter, a spate of studies have appeared recently, revolving especially around the Colfax
Massacre and the case U.S. v. Cruikshank1 that grew out of it. 12 That case has been
described as a watershed in the constriction of federal power to protect civil and political
rights in the South. Constitutional historians have also published a number of excellent
biographies of key Waite Court justices in the past twenty years or so.13
However, there are few studies of the Waite Court itself. Professor Kens' new The
Supreme Court under Morrison R. Waite,14 part of the University of South Carolina
Press's series, ChiefJusticeships of the United States Supreme Court, is one of only three
books that looks at the Court and its decisions as a unit. The others are D. Grier
8. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
9. See, e.g., Howard Gillman, The Waite Court (1874-1888): The Collapse of Reconstruction and the
Transition to Conservative Constitutionalism, in THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THE PURSUIT OF
JUSTICE 124, 129-32 (Christopher Tomlins ed., 2005); DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., THE WAITE COURT:
JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY 150-53 (Peter G. Renstrom ed., 2003).
10. See, e.g., LOREN P. BETH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, 1877-1917, at 138-
215, passim (1971); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED
YEARS, 1789-1888, at 359-452 (1985); SIDNEY FINE, LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE GENERAL-WELFARE STATE: A
STUDY OF CONFLICT IN AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1865-1901, at 126-64 (1956); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE
CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 64-75
(1993); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 161-73 (1993); 3 CHARLES WARREN, THE
SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 284-411 (1922); Walton H. Hamilton, The Path ofDue Process
of Law, 48 Ethics 269 (1938).
11. Historians attend closely to the case both at the circuit court and Supreme Court levels. United States v.
Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707 (C.C.D. La. 1874) (No. 14,897), 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
12. ROBERT M. GOLDMAN, "A FREE BALLOT AND A FAIR COUNT": THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE
ENFORCEMENT OF VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1877-1893 (2001); LEEANNA KEITH, THE COLFAX
MASSACRE (2008); CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE COLFAX MASSACRE, THE SUPREME
COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION (2008).
13. PAUL KENS, JUSTICE STEPHEN FIELD: SHAPING LIBERTY FROM THE GOLD RUSH TO THE GILDED AGE
(1997); LINDA PRZYBYSZEWSKI, THE REPUBLIC ACCORDING TO JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN (1999); MICHAEL
A. Ross, JUSTICE OF SHATTERED DREAMS: SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE
CIVIL WAR ERA (2003).
14. KENS, supra note 1.
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Stephenson's entry in the ABC-Clio volumes on the history of the Supreme Court15 and
Charles Fairman's encyclopedic but unreadable volume on the Waite Court in the
History of the Supreme Court of the United States sponsored by the Oliver Wendell
Holmes Devise. 16
A prolific and respected constitutional historian on the faculties of political science
and history at Texas State University-San Marcos, Kens has prepared a judicious,
insightful, and informative survey of this important Court. As a survey, it should be of
especial use to teachers of constitutional history, specialists in other areas of the field,
and those with a general interest in the history of Supreme Court doctrine. Unfortunately,
it has no bibliography or bibliographical essay-a significant shortcoming in a survey of
this type. Readers will have to rely on discussions of the secondary literature that Kens
presents in the text, as well as his endnotes, which cite much of the current literature.
Much of the information Kens presents will be familiar to constitutional historians
and especially to those who have studied the Court in the Reconstruction era and the
Gilded Age, although, many will learn new things from his discussions of the Sinking-
Fund Cases1 7 and federal land law. More important, Kens challenges established
understandings of the Waite Court in ways that will surely influence future historical
interpretations.
The Waite Court has usually been described as "transitional" in terms of its
jurisdiction, structure, and duties, with its decisions stepping-stones on the way to the
aggressive judicial defense of property rights that characterized laissez-faire
constitutionalism. 18 In the area of civil rights, however, both constitutional historians and
historians of the Civil War and Reconstruction have described it as foreclosing federal
protection of African Americans after the Civil War. In this regard, it has been treated as
transitional only in the sense that the Fuller Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson,19
which sanctioned state-enforced racial segregation, was the natural culmination of Waite
Court precedents. 20
Kens takes issue with this view. He insists that the Waite Court was not a
transitional court at all. Rather, the Waite Court was "traditional." 2 1 "[I]t tended to look
backward for its cues and tended to follow the path that had already been laid," he
writes.2 2 Implicitly, he indicates that the Fuller Court, which succeeded Waite's, was the
real harbinger of the modem Court.
Kens makes his argument most persuasively in his account of cases dealing with
corporate property rights. As he tells the tale, the Waite Court faced an aggressive group
15. STEPHENSON, supra note 9.
16. CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-1888--PART Two (1987).
17. Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700 (1879).
18. STEPHENSON, supra note 9, at 223-28; Gillman, supra note 9.
19. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
20. See ROBERT J. HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY: THE CONSTITUTION, CONGRESS, AND THE
SUPREME COURT 83-103 (1960); JOHN R. HowARD, THE SHIFTING WIND: THE SUPREME COURT AND CIvIL
RIGHTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO BROWN 71-155 (1999); J.R. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 221-52 (2d ed. 1993). All treat judicial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as
running a straight line from Slaughterhouse to Plessy.
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of railroad entrepreneurs who hired the best legal talent of the day to establish the
Constitution as a bulwark against state regulation. They had a powerful ally on the Court
in the indomitable Justice Stephen J. Field, who Kens says sought to make the Court the
protector of corporate property rights-a view at odds with the more benign picture of
Field that Charles McCurdy presented in an influential revisionist article some thirty
years ago.23 Always interpreting statutes to promote railroad interests, Field worked to
secure constitutional protection for corporate property rights through the new Fourteenth
Amendment. Having failed to persuade the Court in Slaughter-House that the
Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause protected property rights against state
infringement, he worked unceasingly to accomplish his goal through the Amendment's
Due Process Clause.
Rather than providing stepping stones for the Court's inexorable adoption of
laissez-faire constitutionalism, Kens writes, Waite and his colleagues resisted. They
repudiated the railroad lawyers' constitutional arguments in the Granger Cases, the
Sinking-Fund Cases, and other decisions. Even the appointment of railroad lawyer
Stanley Matthews in 1881 did not change the Court's course. It would take the
appointment of Waite's successor, Melville W. Fuller, and a new majority of justices
between 1888 and 1892 to change the Court's course.
Kens argues persuasively that in these cases the Court reflected the traditional view
that government had broad powers to regulate the economy in the public interest, as
described in the work of William J. Novak and Harry L. Scheiber24 and as manifested in
the classic Charles River Bridge case.25 Public regulation of property was the norm;
restraints on the police power were the exception. Railroad lawyers wanted to reverse
this understanding. Granger-inspired railroad regulation was more in line with existing
constitutional doctrine than the laissez-faire constitutionalism that challenged it. "[I]f by
'radical' we mean an agent of change," Kens urges, "the term more accurately applies to
railroad lawyers than proponents of rate regulation." 26 The Waite Court's pro-regulatory
jurisprudence represented the "last gasp" of the idea that the rights of the community
took precedence over the property rights of the individual. 27
Kens puts the Court's commitment to protecting the integrity of bankrupt railroads
against the claims of creditors in the same framework. The railroads were simply too
important to both local economies and the national economy to be allowed to fail. He
describes the Court's attitude thus: "[A]ll persons who chose to deal with the corporation
as a creditor did so with the knowledge that, if the railroad went into insolvency, the
court would have a duty to do what was necessary to serve the public." 2 8
23. Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some
Parameters ofLaissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970 (1975).
24. WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA (1996); Harry N. Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose
in the State Courts, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 327-402 (1971). Professor Kens recognizes the
influence of Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (Mass. 1851) as a legal precedent for the broad
understanding of the police power and therefore might also have cited Leonard Levy's seminal discussion of
the case and its context in THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW 229-65 (1957).
25. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
26. KENS, supra note 1, at 77.
27. Kens entitled the relevant chapter, "The Last Gasp of the Rights of the Community." Id. at 78.
28. Id. at 94.
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Yet in other areas of law that Kens describes, the Waite Court does not emerge as
all that concerned with the rights of the community. The Court sided firmly with
bondholders when western communities tried to repudiate the obligations of bonds
issued to foster railroad development. The way in which these bonds were secured and
distributed was often questionable, but the Court sided with the communities only in
cases of the most obvious and outrageous frauds. According to the Court, local efforts to
repudiate bonds secured by sharpers, swindlers, and defaulters almost always ran afoul
of the Obligations of Contracts Clause. In choosing who would bear the loss, the Court
imposed the costs on the local communities rather than on the eastern and foreign
bondholders, whom the justices assumed purchased bonds in good faith. Here Field's
pro-railroad position carried the day against Justice Samuel F. Miller's pro-community
one. This too reflected the Waite Court's traditionalism, Kens says. 29 The justices "could
tie their reasoning to a long tradition," going back to the Marshall Court, "that favored a
system of commerce based on the sanctity of contract." 30
Similarly, the Waite Court respected and built upon precedents that strictly limited
settlers' claims based on preemption or the provisions of federal homestead acts. Kens
reports that these decisions favored large claimants and railroads over ordinary settlers.
They may have followed traditional precedents, but it seems hard to reconcile these
decisions with the notion that community rights trumped property rights.
In his analysis of the Court's economic decisions, Kens identifies a conflict
between the rights of the community championed by the Waite Court majority, and the
property rights of individuals championed by Field. He dismisses an alternative
interpretation that has gained wide currency in the constitutional history literature. It
posits that for nineteenth-century Americans, the key problem was not how to reconcile
the general welfare-that is, the rights of the community-and individual rights. It was
rather the problem of "special" or "class" legislation-how to distinguish public policies
that served the general welfare from those that served the interests of favored individuals
or privileged portions of the community. 3 1 Kens dismisses the seminal work of
constitutional historians and political scientists who have identified the importance of
this problem. In his view, they have simply and erroneously asserted the primacy of
individual over community rights before the Civil War. But hostility to special and class
legislation was different than exaltation of private rights. It was anti-monopolistic and
anti-special privilege. Therefore, it was entirely consistent with broad ideas of
government power to promote the general welfare. Kens fails to see how corporate
lawyers harnessed and reinterpreted a deeply held, essentially egalitarian constitutional
principle into one that exalted private over community rights.
Stressing the Waite Court's traditionalism and its deference to state exercise of the
police powers, Kens understates the degree to which something was happening to the
judicial role in American constitutionalism after the Civil War. Kens points out that most
29. Id. at 66.
30. Id. at 66-67.
31. See GILLMAN, supra note 10; Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the
Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REv. 293 (1985); Alan Jones,
Thomas M Cooley and "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism": A Reconsideration, 53 J. AM. HIST. 751 (1967);
McCurdy, supra note 23.
2011 113
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of the Waite Court justices were committed to the principle of popular sovereignty. But
he interprets that commitment narrowly-as a recognition of broad state police powers
and a deference to their legislative exercise. However, up to and through the Civil War,
popular sovereignty meant something more than this. It meant that the primary
responsibility for making constitutional policy lay with the people, not with judges-not
even the justices of the Supreme Court. The issues separating Hamiltonian Federalist
from Jeffersonian Republican, state-rights Jacksonian from nationalist Whig, proslavery
Democrat from antislavery Republican had all been settled by constitutional politics, not
constitutional law.32 The Court's role was primarily in shaping constitutional law to
accommodate policies already determined through constitutional politics.
Kens does attend briefly but pointedly to the political context surrounding the
Waite Court's decisions, but he does not make clear the degree to which those politics
were constitutional in nature-the degree to which the constitutional issues that came
before the Court had already been thrashed out in the political forums. In the decades
following the Civil War, courts, and especially the Supreme Court, began to stake a
stronger claim to final constitutional authority than they had before and during the war.
The active role that the Waite Court played in determining Reconstruction policy was
part of this change. Never before had the Court played such an aggressive role in shaping
constitutional policy. This is a story hiding in plain sight, a rehearsal for the role the
Court would take in up in the twentieth century.
According to Kens, the Waite Court's restrictive interpretation of federal power to
enforce the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments demonstrated a
commitment to tradition rather than a claim to a broader role in making public policy. He
provides a careful account of the pre-Waite Court Slaughter-House Cases, reflecting
recent studies that have demonstrated that the decision was not intended as a blow
against Reconstruction. 33 He follows this with equally sensitive assessments of
Cruikshank, the Civil Rights Cases, and others in which the justices, he says, tried both
to cabin and maintain federal power to protect rights. Unlike John R. Howard, who
identified this traditionalism primarily in terms of the maintenance of racial hierarchy, 34
and Waite's biographer C. Peter Magrath, who said the decisions were meant to
conciliate the South and ratify the Republican abandonment of the Negro in the
Compromise of 1877,35 Kens endorses the arguments of Pamela Brandwein and myself
that the Court was motivated by a commitment to the traditional roles of state and nation
32. For recent literature making this point, see JOHN J. DINAN, KEEPING THE PEOPLE'S LIBERTIES:
LEGISLATORS, CITIZENS, AND JUDGES As GUARDIANS OF RIGHTS (1998); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA,
ANDREW JACKSON AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE RISE AND FALL OF GENERATIONAL REGIMES (2007); Michael
Les Benedict, Lincoln and Constitutional Politics, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1333 (2010); Gerald Leonard, Party as a
"Political Safeguard of Federalism ": Martin Van Buren and the Constitutional Theory of Party Politics, 54
RUTGERS L. REV. 221 (2001).
33. RONALD M. LABBE & JONATHAN LURIE, THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES: REGULATION,
RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2003); Michael A. Ross, Justice Miller's
Reconstruction: The Slaughter-House Cases, Health Codes, and Civil Rights in New Orleans, 1861-1873, 64 J.
S. HIST. 649 (1998).
34. See HOWARD, supra note 20, at 79-116.
35. C. PETER MAGRATH, MORRISON R. WAITE: THE TRIUMPH OF CHARACTER 112-149 (1963). Magrath
entitled one of his chapters on the Waite Court's handling of civil and voting rights cases "Conciliation: The
Court Faces the Southern Question" and another "Guardian of the Compromise of 1877." Id at 111, 135.
114 Vol. 47:109
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in the federal system.36 For many Republicans, the cases the Waite Court struggled with
"brought to a head the tension between their long-held ideal of federalism and the
Republican desire to secure freedom for blacks." 37 "It is possible," he writes, "that,
rather than only being morally opaque, justices of the era were truly conflicted, perhaps
even confused." 38
In Rethinking the Judicial Settlement ofReconstruction, Professor Brandwein finds
the justices of the Waite Court anything but confused.3 9 In a remarkable feat of scholarly
archeology, Brandwein unearths the surprisingly complete structure of constitutional law
that the Waite Court developed in response to the Civil War constitutional amendments.
She describes the demolition of the Waite Court's doctrines by the Fuller Court that
followed and explains why twentieth-century constitutional scholars failed even to find
its traces. In the process, she challenges both legal and historical understandings of the
Waite Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 40
As to constitutional law, Brandwein demonstrates that the present-day view that
the state-action doctrine limits Congress to acting only when rights violations can be
connected to some positive (even if remote) action of the state is inconsistent with the
original intent of the framers of the Civil War Amendments and the decisions of the
Waite Court. Brandwein recovers "an entire jurisprudence of rights and rights
enforcement [that] has been lost to twentieth-century observers." 4 1 Of course, the
erroneous doctrines that replaced this jurisprudence are now well-established, supported
by a large body of decisions that have both reaffirmed them and reinterpreted them to
expand the meaning of state action. There is little likelihood that Brandwein's careful
exegesis will alter the law. Besides, Brandwein avows "in no uncertain terms, that no
originalist assumptions reside here." 42 At most, a better understanding of the history of
early interpretations of the Civil War Amendments might "create space" for new
constitutional analysis of what are now old questions.43
Brandwein also presents a potent challenge to the orthodox view, articulated most
trenchantly by Robert J. Kaczorowski and Frank J. Scaturro,44 that the Waite Court's
36. Michael Les Benedict, Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite Court, 1978 SUP. CT.
REV. 39 (1978); Pamela Brandwein, A Judicial Abandonment of Blacks? Rethinking the "State Action" Cases
of the Waite Court, 41 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 343 (2007). Kens also had access to the manuscript of Brandwein's
Rethinking the Judicial Settlement ofReconstruction, reviewed in this essay.
37. KENS, supra note 1, at 43.
3 8. Id.
39. PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF RECONSTRUCTION (2011).
40. Brandwein's conclusions are not entirely without precedent. I reached a number of similar ones in
Benedict, supra note 36. See also XI WANG, THE TRIAL OF DEMOCRACY: BLACK SUFFRAGE & NORTHERN
REPUBLICANS, 1860-1910, at 119-33, 207-15 (1997). Nonetheless, Brandwein is correct in her description of
the dominant legal and historical interpretations.
41. BRANDWEIN, supra note 39, at 2.
42. Id. at 240.
43. Id.
44. ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876 (1985); FRANK J. SCATURRO, THE SUPREME
COURT's RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION: A DISTORTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE (2000);
LAWRENCE GOLDSTONE, INHERENTLY UNEQUAL: THE BETRAYAL OF EQUAL RIGHTS BY THE SUPREME
COURT, 1865-1903 (2011). Eric Foner describes the Waite Court's rulings as part of a general retreat from
Reconstruction in his standard account, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877,
at 529 (1988) ("[D]uring the 1870s, responding to the shifting currents of Northern public opinion, it retreated
2011 115
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decisions amounted to a wholesale repudiation of the Republican Reconstruction
program and that they closed the door on federal protection of rights. In their view, the
Republicans shifted primary responsibility for protecting the civil and political rights of
citizenship to the federal government-a revolution in the federal system.45 From this
perspective, the Waite Court's obsessive determination to preserve the traditional
division of authority between the states and the federal government destroyed the clear
meaning of the Civil War constitutional amendments.
Other historians have pointed to the complexities and ambiguities of the
Republican Reconstruction program. They point to the divisions among the Republicans
who framed the legislation and constitutional amendments. They argue that the program
was devised primarily by centrist Republicans, who were committed to protecting
African-American rights without revolutionizing federalism, rather than more radical
Republicans, who urged the revolution in federalism Kaczorowski and Scaturro say
occurred. 4 6 Brandwein's research leads her to agree with this understanding of
Reconstruction. Looking at the Waite Court's decisions and opinions in cases involving
African-American rights, she concludes that the Court reflected the commitments of the
centrist Republicans who had developed the Reconstruction program and who continued
to control the Republican party.
While centrist Republicans posited "a robust definition of national citizenship,"
Brandwein argues that from the beginning they determined to give the national
government corrective power to protect rights rather than primary power. 47 Republican
federalism was "'state-centered,"' she says, in that their program authorized the exercise
of federal power only after states denied rights.48 The Civil Rights Act of 1866, the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Fifteenth Amendment all reflected this determination. 4 9
However, this corrective power was not limited to counteracting positive state actions
infringing rights. American political theory held that the purpose of government was to
secure citizens' rights. The failure to do so because of a victim's race-what Brandwein
labels "state neglect"-was as much a denial of equal rights as was discriminatory
legislation. 50 Brandwein presents overwhelming evidence sustaining her conclusion and
demonstrates conclusively that the Waite Court's decisions reflected the same
understanding. Thus, contrary to present legal doctrine, the Waite Court indicated that
the federal government could prosecute private violations of rights when states failed to
from an expansive definition of federal power, and moved a long way toward emasculating the postwar
amendments.").
45. See Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and
Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863 (1986); Robert J. Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew: Congress,
Citizenship, and Civil Rights After the Civil War, 92 AM. HIST. REv. 45 (1987).
46. MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, Preserving the Constitution: The Conservative Basis of Radical
Reconstruction, in PRESERVING THE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS ON POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
RECONSTRUCTION ERA 3-22 (2006); MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE:
CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1863-1869 (1974); EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS,
THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGREsS, 1863-1869 (1990); ERIC L. McKITRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND
RECONSTRUCTION (1960).
47. BRANDWEIN, supra note 39, at 39.
48. Id.
49. Civil Rights of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; U.S. CONST. amend. X1V; U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
50. See BRANDWEIN, supra note 39, at 28-30.
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do so. The state's inaction itself meant that the private offense was committed under the
color of law or custom.
But for the federal government to gain such jurisdiction, the private actions had to
violate rights secured by the Constitution. Determined to preserve a line between state
and federal jurisdiction, the justices of the Waite Court carefully delineated what those
rights were. Justice Bradley, whose circuit included the states of the Deep South,51
played the crucial role. In his all-important circuit court opinion in the Cruikshank case,
Bradley distinguished between natural, inalienable rights, which were guaranteed or
secured by the Constitution, and rights created by the Constitution in the same way that
any statute or ordinance created rights.52 Brandwein refers to this bifurcated treatment of
rights as making ours a "hybrid Constitution." 53 The secured rights included the great
rights of property, contract, and personal liberty, for the protection of which all
governments were established. Under the American federal system, it was the states'
obligation to protect citizens in these rights. 54 The Fourteenth Amendment authorized
Congress to intervene only when the states failed to do so.
On the other hand, the United States had the direct power to protect citizens in the
rights the Constitution itself created. As the Court made clear in Ex parte Siebols5 5 and
Ex parte Yarbrough,56 the Constitution established federal elections, and Congress could
enact whatever legislation necessary to govern them and protect their integrity, holding
both state officers and private individuals responsible for their actions. Although the
Court found it necessary to use convoluted and negative language, it held that the
Fifteenth Amendment created a new right of not being denied the right to vote on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. As a Constitution-created
right, Congress could enforce it directly upon private individuals, regardless of what
states did in the premises. Likewise, the Thirteenth Amendment created a right to not be
denied state protection of basic rights inherent in freedom on account of race or previous
condition of servitude. 57 While the Thirteenth Amendment has no state-action language,
the Fifteenth Amendment does. Brandwein points out that the construction that Bradley
and the rest of the Waite Court justices put on it in effect created a "Fifteenth-
Amendment Exemption" to the state-action rule. 58
Surprisingly, Brandwein hardly refers to one of the standard questions of
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence-whether Republicans intended the Fourteenth
51. Until the Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826, changed the system, Supreme Court justices were
each assigned to ride a circuit, joining with district court judges to preside over circuit court proceedings.
52. United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707 (C.C.D. La. 1874) (No. 14,897), aff'd, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
53. BRANDWEIN, supra note 39, at 94. 1 think this choice of words is unfortunate. According to the OXFORD
UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 937 (3d ed. 1955), "hybrid" means "(a]nything derived
from heterogeneous sources" or "composed of incongruous elements." While the rights protected by the
Constitution may derive from different sources, that does not speak to the origins of the Constitution itself.
54. Although Brandwein does not make the point, it is clear that this understanding underlies the pre-Waite
Slaughter-House decision as well. Once one recognizes the distinction, it becomes clear that Justice Miller,
who wrote the opinion, considered pre-existing, natural rights to constitute the privileges and immunities of
state citizenship, while the privileges and immunities of United States citizenship consisted of rights created by
the United States Constitution itself
55. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880).
56. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
58. BRANDWEIN, supra note 39, at 98.
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Amendment to bar state infringements of the Bill of Rights and what the Waite Court
said about it. Citing statements by two important Republicans and the influential study
by Michael Kent Curtis,59 she says that Republicans did intend to apply the Bill of
Rights to the states,60 but that the Court foreclosed that formulation for protecting rights
in Slaughter-House before Waite's term began. The Hurtado case, in which the Waite
Court reconfirmed this restrictive interpretation, does not rate a mention. 6 1 Yet the issue
seems closely connected to the distinction Brandwein says the Court made between
rights secured by the Constitution and those created by it.
Finally, Brandwein says the Court distinguished between civil and political rights,
which the Civil War Amendments empowered the government to protect in the
circumstances so carefully delineated above, and social rights, with which the justices
held the Amendments had nothing to do. Bradley articulated that distinction clearly in
the Civil Rights Cases. The Civil Rights Act of 1875 barred private individuals from
discriminating against African Americans in public accommodations and
transportation.62 Not only was there no allegation of state neglect, Bradley opined, but
the Thirteenth Amendment secured only the civil rights inherent in freedom. Equal
access to public accommodations involved equal social rights, which were denied to all
sorts of people who had never been subject to slavery. 63 In taking this position, the Court
reflected the views of centrist Republicans, who Brandwein says had never favored
federal protection of social rights, except during the few, aberrational months in which
they sustained the Civil Rights Act as a testament to the great, recently deceased radical
Charles Sumner. That same centrist opinion endorsed Bradley's decision in the Civil
Rights Cases even as it continued to support federal protection for African-American
civil and political rights. Justice John Marshall Harlan's dissent, in contrast, echoed the
position of radical Republicans that equal access to public accommodations and
transportation was a civil rather than a social right.
Brandwein chronicles the inadequate but persistent efforts on the part of the federal
government to protect civil and voting rights after the Compromise of 1877, which many
erroneously believed ended them. This effort culminated in the attempt to pass a new
federal elections law in 1890. It was the defeat of this so-called Lodge Bill that really
signaled the end of Reconstruction. She calls it "the last gasp of Reconstruction," citing
for support recent studies that have said much the same thing. That disaster opened the
flood gates of southern disfranchisement and segregation, ratified by the Fuller Court,
which dismantled the Waite Court's Civil War Amendments jurisprudence in Plessy v.
59. Id. at 56. Brandwein cites MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986). She also cites the statements, well-known to specialists, of
Representative John A. Bingham, CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1088-95, 2542-43 (1866) and Senator
Jacob M. Howard, id at 2765-66.
60. Id.
61. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
62. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
63. Although Bradley did not make this explicit, Brandwein points out that it was well known that Jews and
Irish, among others, were denied equal access to public accommodations although they had not been slaves and
were recognized as white. BRANDWEIN, supra note 39, at 175.
64. Id. at 182; See generally CHARLES W. CALHOUN, CONCEIVING A NEW REPUBLIC: THE REPUBLICAN
PARTY AND THE SOUTHERN QUESTION, 1869-1900 (2006); RICHARD M. VALELLY, THE TWO
RECONSTRUCTIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK ENFRANCHISEMENT 1-144 (2004).
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Ferguson,65 James v. Bowman,66 and Hodges v. US.6 7 By the twentieth century, the
earlier jurisprudence was entirely lost to law and legal scholarship---a result explained in
part by the repudiation of natural-rights notions of law upon which Bradley's careful
distinctions rested and the rise of the case-book method of imparting law, which
eschewed careful consideration of historical context and ignored lower-court cases,
where judicial understandings of Supreme Court doctrines are often explicated.
Brandwein's reconstruction of the Waite Court's rights decisions is compelling,
but whether one agrees that the Waite Court's jurisprudence was consistent with
Republican Reconstruction will depend on one's view of the original program.
Historians who believe that the Republican commitment to federalism circumscribed
their Reconstruction legislation will agree; those who believe Republicans intended a
revolutionary transfer of power to the federal government will not. Brandwein's
evidence on that score is not as fully developed as the evidence that sustains her
interpretation of the court decisions. Readers who want to decide for themselves will
have to turn to histories of the development of the Republican Reconstruction program,
if not to the original sources themselves.68
Because her project is different, Brandwein attends to constitutional arguments in
Congress and the public sphere in a way Kens does not. She utilizes the constitutional
politics of Reconstruction to elucidate the Waite Court's doctrines and to support her
argument that they were consistent with the centrist Republican program. She does not
discuss the Court's decisions and opinions as part of a larger process, but her discussion
makes clear that this was the case-for example, when she describes how the failure of
the Lodge Bill of 1890 set the stage for the Fuller Court's reversal of Waite Court
doctrine.
However, in linking the Waite Court's jurisprudence to the centrist Republican
Reconstruction program so effectively, Brandwein minimizes the Waite Court's
assertiveness. She herself makes clear that the Court reshaped the centrist program in
fundamental ways. The justices repudiated the Republican understanding that the
Fourteenth Amendment applied the Bill of Rights to the states. Contrary to Republican
intentions, they limited congressional authority to protect Civil War Amendment rights
against private violation to instances in which they were motivated by the race of the
victims. Brandwein is right that the decisions preserved federal power to protect rights,
but they significantly altered the policy Americans had established in a bitter
constitutional struggle. Moreover, the Court could have established its interpretive
principles by statutory interpretation rather than ruling important provisions of the laws
65. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
66. James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903).
67. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
68. Compare the analyses of Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and
Reconstruction, supra note 45; Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew: Congress, Citizenship, and Civil
Rights After the Civil War, supra note 45, and SCATURRO, supra note 44, with BENEDICT, PRESERVING THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 46; BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 46,; MALTZ, supra note
46, and MCKITRICK, supra note 46. See also 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 99-
252 (1998); DAVID HERBERT DONALD, THE POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION 1863-1867 (1965); FONER, supra
note 44, at 228-80; DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, THEORY, AND
LAW OF THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS (1993).
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unconstitutional. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the Court was flexing its
muscles.
Professors Kens and Brandwein have given us new, more nuanced accounts of the
Waite Court's constitutional jurisprudence. Theirs will be the standard accounts to which
constitutional scholars will turn for a long time to come. However, there is still room to
assess the Supreme Court's role in the broader constitutional politics of the
Reconstruction era. For any such project, Kens' and Brandwein's work will be the
starting points.
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